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Recent Cases
BANKRUPTCY-SUBSEQUENT

PROMISE To PAY DISCHARGED DEBT AS CREATING

NEW OBLIGATION SUBJECT TO DISCHARGE IN LATER PROCEEDINGS

Shepherd v. McDonald'
The appellant, Shepherd, was indebted to the appellee, McDonald, upon
notes held by her. This indebtedness was listed in bankruptcy proceedings instituted
by Shepherd and as a result of which he was discharged October 21, 1931. On
June 5, 1934, McDonald brought an action in the circuit court in Oregon to recover
the amounts due upon the notes. Shepherd pleaded the discharge. The reply
alleged a subsequent promise to pay. The verdict and judgment were for McDonald.
On December 16, 1941, Shepherd filed a second petition in bankruptcy in which
the only unsecured creditor listed was McDonald. McDonald objected to Shepherd's
discharge from the judgment, contending that the judgment is the same obligation
as the notes and that the debtor is not entitled to a second discharge from the
same obligation. The referee sustained her contentions. The district court affirmed
the order of the referee. 2 The court held that Shepherd, by his subsequent promise,
waived the personal defense of the discharge; that the judgment is the same obligation as the notes; and that a second discharge from those obligations may not be
had. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the judgment was not obtained
upon the notes, but upon the new promise, and therefore was a new and distinct obligation from which the bankrupt might be relieved.
Before consideration of the question whether a debtor may be twice relieved
from the same obligation, it is necessary to determine the effect of the subsequent
promise of the bankrupt. It is definitely settled that an express, unequivocal
promise to pay gives the barred creditor a right of action, 3 but the courts are divided
upon the legal operation of such a promise. One theory is that the original obligation
4
is left in force, the promise operating as a waiver of the defense of the discharge;
the other that the moral obligation of the relieved debtor to pay furnishes the
consideration for the new promise, and that the new promise is the cause of action.5
1. 157 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 9th, 1946).
2. In re Sheperd, 61 F. Supp. 948 (D. Ore. 1945).
3. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 158; 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
(rev. ed. 1940) § 17.33.
4. Tubbs v. McCabe, 5 Harr. 327, 165 Atl. 336 (Del. 1933); Marshall v.
Tracy, 74 Ill. 379 (1874); Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. 238 (Mass. 1850); Badger v.
Gilmore, 33 N. H. 361 (1856).
5. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625 (1913); Craig v. Seitz, 63 Mich. 727, 30
N. W. 347 (1886); Fleming v. Lullman, 11 Mo. App. 104 (1881); Depuy v. Swart,
3 Wend. 136 (N. Y. 1829); Herrington v. Davitt, 220 N. Y. 162, 115 N. E. 476
(1917); Field's Estate, 2 Rawle 351 (Pa. 1830); Walbridge v. Harroon, 18 Vt.
448 (1846).
(206)
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A barred creditor was allowed to recover in Trueman v. Fenton, 1777.6 It was
stated that "the single question is whether it is possible for the bankrupt in part
or for the whole to revive the old debt" and a comparison was made to cases under
the statute of limitations and infants' ratification of their contracts. However, the
action was upon the new promise (notes) and the court stated: "the debts were
not extinguished in conscience"; "the moral obligation united to a new promise
makes a new undertaking and agreement." Recovery in this case might have been
regarded as exceptional because of the conduct of the debtor, which the court
described as "grossly dishonest." However, it was not, and the case appears to
have been accepted as the general rule only twenty-two years later.?
From this early decision with its two lines of reasoning, it was to be expected
that two distinct theories would develop. In determining the effect of the subsequent promise, the decisions of the courts appear to have been guided by two
factors. The first is the court's assumption regarding the effect of the discharge
of the debtor. It is generally accepted that the discharge affords only a personal
defense to the debtor and leaves the debt unimpaired. 8 In a large number of cases
involving the present question, the court's first assumption is that the discharge
extinguished or destroyed the original obligation. 9 However erroneous this may
be, it requires the adoption of the theory of recovery upon the new promise. Second,
the theory needed by the particular plaintiff for recovery has apparently had
its influence upon the decisions. An action brouglht upon the new promise necessitated the adoption of the rule of recovery upon the new promise. 10 However,
to aid those who pleaded upon. the original promise, an exceptional rule of pleading
was developed, and a reply of the new promise was not considered a departure.3l
Even this exceptional doctrine would not permit recovery in certain cases and
in many of them the theory of waiver was adopted.12 This factor did not control
every decision of course, but was perhaps the difference between two theories
which apparently have equal merit.
Later cases reflect the uncertainty of the courts as to the correct solution,
the decisions mingling the two theories and seemingly being the repetition of a
6.
7.
8.
F. (2d)

2 Cowp. 544 (K. B. 1777).
Roberts v. Morgan, 2 Esp. 736 (1799).
In re Innis, 140 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944); Helms v. Holmes, 129
263 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942); In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N. D. N. Y. 1933);
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (rev. ed. 1940) § 17.27.
9. Alper v. Republic Inv. Co., 82 F. (2d) 619 (App. D. C. 1936); Fleming
v. Lullman, 11 Mo. App. 104 (1881); Depuy v. Swart, 3 Wend. 136 (N, Y. 1829);
Kravitz v. Povlotsky, 3 A. (2d) 922 (Pa. 1939); Walbridge v. Harroon, 18 Vt. 488
(1846).
10. Trueman v. Fenton, 2 Cowp. 544 (K. B. 1777).
11. Craig v. Seitz, 63 Mich. 727, 30 N. W. 347 (1886); Donnell v. England,
345 Mo. 726, 137 S. W. (2d) 471 (1940); DeWalt v. Heeren, 50 N. D. 804, 197
N. W. 868 (1924); Dusenbury v. Hoyt, 53 N; Y. 521 (1873); Turner v. Chrisman,
20 Ohio 333 (1851).
12. Tubbs v. McCabe, 5 Harr. 327, 165 Atl. 336 (Del. 1933); Way v. Sperry,
6 Cush. 239 (Mass. 1850); Underwood v. Eastman, 18 N.H. 582 (1847).
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formula which allows recovery to the barred creditor.', Neither theory is a satisfactory explanation of allowing recovery. It is certain that any consideration
supplied by the obligation from which the debtor has been relieved is only moral
consideration. It certainly would not support any undertaking other than to pay
the original indebtedness.' 4 The doctrine of moral consideration has fallen from
favor and is generally abandoned by the courts.' 5 As there would seem to be no
particular merit in the morality of the debtor's obligation, this recognition of moral
consideration should fall under the general condemnation of that doctrine.
The theory of waiver of the defense of the discharge is hardly more justifiable.
Professor Williston sets forth three strong objections to recovery upon such a
theory.' He further states that such rules of recovery were fictions employed by
the courts "to find some way to hold liable on a new promise any person whose
a
defense . . . though technically valid, had no substantial foundation in justice."'
The Restatement of Contracts has recognized these fictions, and as a solution without employing them, has declared that the promise to pay the barred claim is
enforceable, though made without consideration."
In deciding the principle case, the district court relied upon the analogy of
the prohibition'of a discharge from debts listed in a prior proceeding in which
the bankrupt failed to apply for the discharge (before the Chandler Act) or to pay
the costs of the proceeding. The court stated that if this were the feeling of the
courts toward a bankrupt who neglected to press his proceedings, a bankrupt who
waived his right to relief in regard to a particular debt was forever barred in
seeking further relief from that obligation. Such relief would be "an abuse of
process and an imposition upon the court." The judges of the circuit court of
appeals, while differing as to the effect of the subsequent promise, indicated they
would allow the second discharge of the same obligation. A concurring opinion
stated that the doctrine of waiver would prevent a second discharge of the same
obligation.
13. "Yet if recognizing the moral force of that obligation, he by his note
(the second) expressly promised to do so pro tanto, that obligation was revived to
the extent of the promise so made, and became a sufficient consideration to support
the promise contained in said note." Wislizenus v. O'Fallon, 91 Mo. 184, 190 (1886).
"Liability rests upon the new promise to pay, not the original note. The discharge
took the enforceability from the original note which still evidenced the moral
obligation and the new note revived the legal obligation." Stanek v. White, 172
Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784 (1927).
14. See Spann v. Read Phosphate Co., 238 Fed. 338 (C.C.A. 4th, 1916);
Badger v. Gilmore, 33 N.H. 361 (1856).
15. 1 WILLISTON, CONRnACrs (rev. ed. 1938) § 147. It is interesting to note
that the exponent of moral consideration, Lord Mansfield, decided Trueman v. Fenton.
16. Lack of consideration for the waiver; that the promise, generally, is not
in terms of a waiver of a defense, but a promise to pay; and that the original
obligation is hot the measure of recovery, but the subsequent promise is the
measure. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 203.
17. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 201..
18. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 87.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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If the theory of waiver of the defense be adopted, the obligation listed in the
second proceedings is the same obligation which was involved in the first proceedings. 19 As the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to proceedings in bank-

ruptcy, 0 the rights of the parties having been adjudicated in respect to that
obligation, it would seem a necessary result that no second proceedings could be
21
maintained upon the obligation.
The bankruptcy act provides that a discharge shall release the debtor from an
his proveable debts with certain exceptions, the present situation not being included'
in such exceptions. 22 The courts have announced that these exceptions shall
be construed in favor of the bankrupt. 23 Thferefore, if recovery is allowed upon

the new promise supported by moral or no consideration, prima facie the debtor
would be relieved from the debt.

However, the adoption of such theories ought not to foreclose consideration
of the question of the second discharge. The applicable provision of the Bankruptcy Act has not prevented the courts from creating other exceptions by means;
of the doctrine of res judicata.2 In bankruptcy proceedings the courts as a rule.
require debtors to be diligent in their quest for relief and their use of the relief
obtained.25 The privileged is not created from the air; it is the result of the
deprivation of certain rights of creditors. The relief is obtained at no small expense
to the government. That such relief is desirable, even necessary, in the normal

situation is not doubted. The obligation in question, while resulting from a -newpromise, is solely dependent upon the original obligation for its existence. It should.
not be treated as the usual debt presented for discharge. For purposes of thesecond application it might be considered as the re-embodiment of the original
obligation, the doctrine of res judicata thereby preventing relief from that debt.
That is to say, having once availed himself of, the privilege afforded at the
19. That a judgment is not a different obligation. Boynton v. Ball, 121
U.S. 457 (1887); I. re Summer, 107 F. (2d) 396 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939).
20. Note (1946) 32 VA. L. REv. 642.
21. But see the principle case; "If the district court was correct in its contention that the judgment was the identical claim discharged in the first bankruptcy,.
then the doctrine of res judicata would require it to be held dischargeable in the
second bankruptcy." Sheperd v. McDonald, 157 F. (2d) 467, 469 (C.C.A. 9th
1946); Note (1946) 46 CoL. L. REv. 293.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1940).
23. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35, n. 9.
24. Note (1946) 32 VA. L. REv. 642.
25. Colwell v. Epstein, 142 F. (2d) 138, 139 (C.C.A. 1st, 1944) (failure t&,
pay costs); In re Innis, 140 F. (2d) 479 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) (failure to plead
defense of discharge); Perlman v. 322 West 72nd St. Co., 127 F. (2d) 716 (C.C.A.
2d, 1942) (failure to pay costs); Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. (2d) 263 (C.C.A. 4th,
1942), 141 A.L.R. 1367 (failure to plead defense of discharge). In commenting
upon Perlman v. 322 West 72nd St. Co., supra, the court in Colwell v. Epstein,
supra, said: "The court stated that the burden is on the bankrupt to obtain the
benefits of the act by his own action, and that where the first petition was dismissed for lack of prosecution on the part of the bankrupt, he must suffer theconsequences of his failure to prosecute his cause, and the matter is res judicata
as between him and the creditors."
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expense of his creditors and of the state and voluntarily nullified his defense, the
debtor perhaps should not obtain relief from an obligation existing solely because
of an original obligation, which original obligation has already been adjudicated
in a bankruptcy proceeding.
ALMON H. MAUS

INSURANcE-CONSTRUcTION
IN

CONVERSION

OF WORDS

"EVIDENCE

OF INSURABILITY"

CLAUSE OF ANNUITY POLICY

Rosenbloom v. New York Life Ins. Co.1
Defendant insurance company in 1938 issued to Jay R. Rosenbloom an annuity
policy which contained the following provisions: "This policy is free of conditions
as to residence, travel, occupation, and military or naval service .. . The annuitant
may exchange this policy for a policy on the ordinary life . . . plan of insurance

upon presentation at the home office of evidence of insurability satisfactory to
the company." (Italics added) At that time, defendant did not insert war clauses
in ordinary life insurance policies, but on the contrary specifically provided that
they were "free of conditions as to residence, travel, occupation, and military or
naval service." The annuitant at that time was thirteen years of age. Late
in 1943, the annuitant, being of draft age and desiring to convert his annuity
policy to one on the ordinary life plan of insurance, was told by defendant that
the desired policy would contain a war clause. The annuitant refused to accept
the policy offered with a war clause therein. Soon after, the annuitant entered
naval service and was killed in a ship explosion while on foreign duty. The action
is by the annuitant's father for specific performance of the contract to give the
policy without a war clause and for payment of death benefits under the policy.
Held, for defendant. (1) Defendant did not consider the annuitant's insurability
when issuing the annuity policy and thus was entitled to consider it at the time
of conversion. (2) The converted policy is a new contract and defendant is not
obligated to carry any terms and benefits of the annuity contract into the new
policy.
The court recognized that "insurability" by the weight of authority includes
more than good health and an insurable interest, although some authority to
the contrary cart be found.2 It has been held to include the following factors:
the amount of additional insurance held with other companies; 3 the financial con-

1. 65 F. Supp. 692 (W. D. Mo. 1946).
2. The cases are collected in (1946) 162 A.L.R. 668 and all involve reinstatement rather than conversion. There would seem to be no distinction as far
as the meaning of the term "insurability" is concerned.
3. Greenberg v. Continental Casualty Co., 24 Cal. App. (2d) 506, 75 P.
(2d) 644 (1938); Kahn v. Continental Casualty Co., 325 Ill. App. 1, 59 N.E.
(2d) 524 (1945) reversed on other grounds, 391 Ill. 445, 63 N.E. (2d) 468 (1945).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1947], Art. 4

RECENT CASES
-dition and mental attitude of the insured toward suicide; 4 use of intoxicating
liquors and marital relations; 5 aerial flights.6
The court relied solely on Kirby v. Prudential Life Ins Co.7 That decision,
where the insured sought reinstatement which the company refused because
of admittedly regular participation in 'aerial flights, rested expressly on the fact
that the company had been told in the original application for the policy that the
insured did not so engage in regular aerial flights. 8 It is distinguishable from
the instant case in that questions were asked concerning aviation in the original
application and the policy there contained no statement saying there were no
conditions as to residence, travel, occupation, and military service as did the
policy in suit.
The court distinguished Sussex v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,9 saying it was not
in point. The basis for the court's distinction was that under Missouri decisions
a converted or reinstated policy is a new contract, while under Ontario decisions
such a policy is not a new contract but an extension of the old contract. This is
immaterial since in both- jurisdictions the right to convert or reinstate the policy
is given by the original contract and the terms of that contract, which were
fixed when the contract was made, must govern the exercise of that right.10 The
Sussex case would seem to be more in point than the Kirby case since the Sussex
case not only involved military service but, as in the principal case, no questions
concerning military service were asked in the original application and the policy
contained a comparable statement that there were no conditions as to occupation,
residence, travel, and military service." This raises the real issue in the principal
case which is the meaning of "insurability" and the effect the statement that
"this policy is free of conditions as to residence, travel, occupation, and military
or naval service" has on that meaning. The Sussex case is strong authority for the
view that in such case an individual's "insurability" cannot be affected by military
service.
The statement in the annuity policy that no conditions as to military servie
were attached and the fact that life insurance policies in 1938 carried the same
statement are subject to two constructions as they affect the meaning of "insurability," (1) that the defendant considered military service as it affected an appli-

4. Kallman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 248 App. Div. 146, 288 N.Y.
Supp. 1032 (1st Dep't 1936) aflirned, 272 N.Y. 648, 5 N.E. (2d), 375 (1937).
(The origin of the phrase "evidence of insurability" is given here as statutory.)
5. Bankers Life Co. v. Bowie, 121 F. (2d) 779 (C.C.A. 10th, 1941).
6. Kirby v. P'rudential Ins. Co., 191 S.W. (2d) 379 (Mo. App. 1945).
7. Ibid.
8. But cf. Kahn v. Continental Casualty Co., 391 Ill. 445, 63 N.E. (2d0
468 (1945) reversing 325 Ill. App. 1, 59 N.E. (2d) 524 (1945).
9. 38 Ont. L. Rep. 365, 33, D.L.R. 549 (1917).
10. 6 COUCH, INSURANCE (1930) § 1375 and cases cited.
11. This is the basis on which the court in the Kirby case distinguished the
Sussex case. The court also pointed out that misconstruction of the Sussex case
accounted for the small group of cases restricting "insurability" to good health and
an insurable interest.
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cant's insurability and merely indicated by the statement that that risk was covered
by the policy, (2) that military service was regarded as having no effect on an
applicant's insurability. Under the rule indicated by the court in the Kirby case,
the first construction would allow the defendant to consider military service as
it affected "insurability" for purposes of reinstating or converting policies. It is
submitted that the first construction is unreasonable when viewed from the standpoint of a layman. Assuming the first construction to be reasonable, the statement is then ambiguous and the well-established rule that ambiguous words are
construed against the writer should be invoked as it often is in the case of insurance
contracts. Moreover, the Sussex case is clear authority for the adoption of the
second construction.
ROBERT L. HAWKINS, JR.

INSURANCE-EXCEPTED

RISKS-INJURIES RESULTING FROM WAR

Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co.'
While on active duty as a member of the United States Marine Corps Reserve,
the son of the plaintiff was killed in New Zealand on May 19, 1943. The death
occurred during maneuvers when the deceased, acting as an "enemy" scout, was
attempting to escape his captors and jumped into a clump of bushes which
concealed the edge of a seventy-five foot cliff. The plaintiff brings this action
to recover the double indemnity benefit in the policy issued on the life of the
son by the defendant insurance company. The company resists payment of a
larger amount than the face value of the policy on the grounds that the death
was within an exception to the double indemnity clause, which provided that
the double indemnity benefit should not be payable "if the insured's death resulted,
directly or indirectly from . . . (d)

war or any act incident thereto." A federal

district court gave a judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the double
indemnity benefit, holding that the death of the insured was not within the
stated exception to the double indemnity clause.
This case is one of a small group marking the renascence of a question which
was the basis for much litigation following the first World War, with a seeming
variety of conclusions.2 The issue in each case has generally been formed by
the words of the particular policy involved; the presence or absence of one word
in the exception clause has often decided whether recovery is to be granted or
denied. But the broad question in this group of cases is the extent to which
an insurance company can be held liable for the benefits due from the death of
a serviceman under a policy containing a clause excepting liability because of
his status as a serviceman or the hazards incident thereto.
The validity of such exception clauses has become so well settled that the
1. 66 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
2. See 37 CJ. 546; (1942) 137 A.L.R. 1263 and cases cited therein.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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point was not raised in the case at hand. Almost unanimously the courts have
held them valid, generally over the objection that the clauses are against public
policy, presumably because they would tend to reduce voluntary enlistments
3
in the armed forces.
As the court in the instant case points out, the purpose of exception clauses
in life insurance policies is "to limit the area of risk assumed by the insurer, by
excluding a type of hazard from which the risk of loss is not susceptible of actuarial
prediction or is too great to be borne by the insurer for the premium charged. " 4
Yet it is quite as apparent that the particular area excluded by the clause can
only be properly delineated by construing the wording of the clause involved. 5
Thus when a court, in a case involving a clause excepting liability for death
"while engaged in any military or naval service in time of war,? begins with the
premise that the company only intended to exclude the hazards peculiar to warfare,6 it would appear that the most puzzling question of the case has been answered in the hypothesis on which the court based its reasoning.
Although the exception clause in the case under consideration includes the
word "var", the facts created no necessity for the court to define -what was embraced by that word.7 Where the insured was a sailor killed in the Japanese attack
of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the courts have divided upon the question
of whether the death was within a clause excepting liability for deaths resulting
from war.8
The usual and perhaps the only practicable classification of the exception
clauses involved in these cases divides them into two groups. One type of clause
would seem to make the mere status of the insured as a member of the armed
forces the criterion for non-liability; the other type excepts liability for death
3. Reid v. American Nat. Assur. Co., 204 Mo. App. 643, 218 S.W. 957
(1920): Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 225 S.W. 106 (Mo. App. 1920), affirmed
in 248 S.W. 923 (Mo. 1923).
4. Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., cited supra note 1.
5. (1942) 137 A.L.R. 1263 at 1269.
6. Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., cited supra note 3.
7.

See comments (1920) 19 MicH. L. REv. 225, (1921) 7 Va.

L. REv. 552

for definitions and discussion of "war."
8. 'West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E. (2d) 475
(1943), where recovery was denied on the ground that war did not exist until the
formal declaration by Congress the next day. Contra: New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Bennion, 158 F. (2d) 260 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946), where the court in a realistic
opinion seriously questioned the reasoning that war with Japan did not exist on
December 7, 1941, and held that the parties did not intend to contract in regard
to formal war but in contemplation of "any type or kind of war." See Stankus
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E. (2d) 687 (1942), where
recovery was denied for the death of a sailor lost in the sinking of the destroyer
U.S.S. Reuben James by a submarine in the Atlantic on October 30, 1941, on the
grounds that the death was a result of war, although the United States had not
yet entered the war.
See also Vanderbilt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 248, 184 N.Y.S. 54
(Sup. Ct. 1920); note (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 552; comment (1920) 19 Mick. L.
REv. 225.
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only when it results from military or naval service. While the bare wording of
the exception clauses generally supports such a distinction, in construing them
the courts have not followed this line of cleavage with unanimity.
Thus in the broadest type of exception clause, relieving the company from
liability for "death while in the service

. . .

in time of war," it appears that the

company need only show the status of the insured as a serviceman to escape
liability; and so the majority of courts have held.9 But the same clause has been
construed to mean that only death resulting from the peculiar hazards of military
service was within the exception.1o
A type of clause affording a reasonable opportunity for the use of the familiar
rule of resolving ambiguities strictly against the insurance company is that creating
non-liability for the death of the insured "while engaged in military or naval service
in time of war." The inclusion of the word "engaged," the only substantial difference
between this clause and the clause previously discussed, has been sufficient to
convince the majority of the courts that this is a result clause rather than a status
clause, applyirig only where the death of the insured was caused by hazards of
a peculiarly military nature.11 Other courts have failed to see this rather fine
distinction built upon the use of the word "engaged" in the exception clause"
The clause in the case under consideration is a clear example of the result type
of exception clause; here non-liability exists only if the death of the insured was
caused either directly or indirectly by war or any act incident thereto. What
hazards this clause does or does not include is, of course, the question for decision.
That the death of a soldier from disease while on a furlough is not included within
a result clause is rather clear.!3 Non-liability has also been denied under such
an exception clause when the insured soldier died in training from disease"4 or
an accidental gunshot wound by a fellow soldier, 5 and when the death resulted
from a motorcycle injury one hundred miles behind the battle front in Europe.10
By saying that the question for determination in the case at hand is the scope
9. Miller v. Illinois Bankers Life Assn., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310, 7 A.L.R.
378 (1919) is the leading case on this point.
10. Illinois Bankers Life Assn. v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 226 P. 101 (1924),
comment (1925) 23 MxcH. L. REv. 418.
11. Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S.W. 462
(1919). The Missouri courts at first construed such clauses as status clauses. Reid
v. American Nat. Assur. Co., cited sutpra note 3: Slaughter v. Protective League
Life Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 352, 223 S.W. 819 (1920). Later Long v. St. Joseph
Life Ins. Co., cited supra note 3, followed the majority opinion in holding that
"engaged" clauses limited non-liability on a result basis.
12. Bradshaw v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332,
11 A.L.R. 1091 (1920).
13. Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., cited =pra note 3, where the court,
besides construing the exception clause to apply only to the hazards of war, relies
upon a questionable analogy between a soldier on furlough and a civilian away
from his business on vacation.
14. Benham v. American Cent. Life Ins. Co., cited supra note 11.
15. Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., 202 Mo. App. 499, 213 S.W. 877 (1919).
16. Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N.W. 152, 4 A.L.R.
845 (1919).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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to be given "acts incident to war," the court implicitly denies that the inclusion of
the words "directly or indirectly" in the clause has any effect upon the limits
of non-liability the clause creates. A different view was taken in an English case
involving a similar exception clause.' 7 There the death of the insured, a British
Army officer, occurred when he was struck by a train while inspecting soldiers
guarding a railroad line in England. The normal lighting facilities had been obscured in compliance with war-time regulations, and the death took place within
an area which only military personnel were permitted to enter. In holding that
the death was included by the exception clause, the court said that the words
"directly or indirectly" contemplate a more remote link in the chain of causation
than the proximate and immediate cause, and that the war can be said to have been
the indirect cause of the death.
In Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co.,' s the only case in point involving an
exception clause worded in precisely the same way as the case under discussion,
the death of the insured soldier took place in a tank accident during training
in the United States. The court in that case held that the death was within
the exception clause, on the reasoning that it resulted from military training,
that training is essential to the development of effective troops for later combat
service, and, therefore, that the death was a result of an act incident to war.
The least that could be said of a death under such circumstances, stated the
court, is that it was indirectly caused by war.
Disagreeing with the Eggena case, the court in the case at hand stated that
military training in time of war was not an incident of war within the meaning
of the clause, on the apparent basis that military training exists in peacetime as
well as during a war. That this conclusion springs inevitably from the premises is,
it would seem, questionable from a purely logical standpoint. As an additional
reason for the result, the court states that the insurer probably didn't intend to
except hazards remote from combat areas since the bulk of our casualties resulted
from enemy action. Quaere, whether the court would have so readily reached
this conclusion if the case had been concerned with" the death of an airplane
pilot during training, where the rate of fatal accidents was commonly known
to be extremely high.
The court, however, stressed the fact that it was not restricting the exception
clause to include only death from enemy action, citing as an example of such narrow
construction the Missouri case of Redd v. A'nerican Cent. Life Ins. Co.' In that
case the cout, borrowing a dictionary definition, said that "active service," in
the military sense, was action "before the enemy," "operations carried on in his
presence," and that an exception clause relieving liability for deaths resulting
from active service was limited to the defined situations.
The court would thus seem to be striving to find a basis for decision intermediate to the Eggena and Redd cases. The conclusion reached is that "the policy
17. Coxe v. Employers' Liability Ass. Corp. Ltd., 2 K.B. 629 (1916).
18. 18 N.W. (2d) 530 (Iowa 1945).
19. 200 Mo.App.383, 207 S.W.74 (1918). Comment (1918) 6 VA. L. REv. 64.
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exception here includes, besides combat casualties, only such other deaths as result
from activities in immediate support of operations against the enemy, or from enemy
action not in combat, such as the sinking of a troop transport, or from other activities peculiar to war."20 How much this conclusion expands the strict "death in
action" criterion of the Redd case or restricts the apparently valid causation
analysis of the Eggena case depends upon the construction given by a particular
court to the apparently contradictory phrase "from enemy action not in combat"
and the vague language of the last phrase, which merely defines the exception clause
in its own terms. Quaere whether the logical reasoning of the Eggena case, notwithstanding the latitude it gives to the exception clause, should be abandoned in favor
of the conclusion reached by this court.
Guy A. MAGRUDER, JR.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY

OF MASTER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF BORROWED
SERVANT

R-assell et al. v. Union Electric Co. of Mirsourl'
Action by Ralph V. Russell and another against Union Electric Company of
Missouri to recover damages for destruction by fire of plaintiff's dwelling and
contents thereof allegedly caused by defendant's negligence.
Plaintiff authorized the defendant to make changes in the wiring of plaintiff's
dwelling which were necessary for the use of an electric range purchased by plaintiff from defendant. A few days after the range was purchased from defendant
by Mr. Russell, George Hoefer, an employee of the County Electric and Gas Appliance Company, did the re-wiring of the plaintiff's residence. The negligence alleged
was that Hoefer inadvertently drove staples through the insulation on the wire;
removed them and drove them in properly; that because of thiis negligent installation a "short" resulted which ignited the surface of the conducting wire and
caused the damage complained of. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was
liable for the damage caused by the negligence of its servant. The defendant contended it was not liable to plaintiff because Hoefer, who made the installation,
was not the servant of the defendant.
The court concluded, as to the acts in question, that Hoefer was acting as the
servant of the defendant who was liable for the negligence of such servant.
An employee in the general service of another may be transferred with his
general employer's consent for some special purpose so as to become, as to that
service, the employee of another if the latter has exclusive control over his work.20. Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., cited supra note 1,loc. cit. 318.
1. 191 S.W. (2d) 278 (Mo. App. 1945).
2. Ellegood v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 236 Mo. App. 971, 162 S.W.
(2d) 628 (1942); Clayton v.Wells, 324 Mo. 1176, 26 S.W. (2d) 939 (1930);
Maher v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 323 Mo. 799, 20 S.W. (2d) 888 (1929);
Karguth v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 229 Mo. 580, 253 S.W. 367 (1923);
Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 220,29 Sup. Ct.252 (1909); Barlow v. Shawnee Investment Co., 229 Mo. App. 51, 48 S.W. (2d) 35 (1932); Simmons v. Kansas City Jockey Club, 334 Mo. 99, 66 S.W. (2d) 119 (1933).
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Where the original master loans his servant to another employer and surrenders full
control of the servant in the performance of the work, such employer is not liable
for the negligence of the servant in the performance of the work of the borrowing
employer.3 The test of liability for the acts of the borrowed or loaned employee is
whether in the particular service in which the servant is engaged or which he is
requested to perform he continues liable to the direction and control of his original master or becomes subject to that of the person to whom he is hired. 4 It is
not so much the actual exercise of control but whether or not the right to exercise
such control existed.5 If the temporary employer has the right to exercise such
control over the conduct of the employee as would make the employee his servant
were it not for his general employment, the employee, as to such act, becomes the
servant of the temporary employer." The control of the employee is the right to
.order and direct the employee's physical activities in doing the work.7
The important question is not whether he remains the employee of the general
,employer as to matters generally, but whether, as to the act in question, he is
acting in the business and under the direction of one or the other; whether he is
to be employed in the business of and subject to the direction of the temporary
-employer as to the details of such act."
There seems to be no dissent from these general principles; but as so frequently happens, the difficulty here encountered is that of applying the law to
the facts. Several factors would indicate that Hoefer did not become subject to
defendant's control and direction. Hoefer testified he was not an employee of defendant; that he was not paid by it; that he did the re-wiring at plaintiff's residence
-upon the receipt of a work-order from his employer, the County Electric and Gas
Appliance Co.; that no one from defendant company told Hoefer to do the work;
that no one from defendant company was present while the re-wiring was being
done; that he was furnished with a "check-list" as a directive for doing the work
according to instructions contained therein. However, Hoefer testified further that
3. McFarland v. Dixie Machinery & Equipment Co., 348 Mo. 341, 153
S.W. (2d) 67, 136 A.L.R. 516 (1941).
4. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 Sup Ct. 252 (1909).
5. O'Brien v. Rindskopf, 334 Mo. 1233, 70 S.W. (2d) 1085 (1934); State exrel
Chapman v. Shain, 347 Mo. 308, 147 S.W. (2d) 457, 462 (1941); Roman v.
Hendricks, 80 S.W. (2d) 907 (1935); Sargent Paint Co. v. Petrovitsky, 71 Ind.
App. 353, 124 N.E. 881, 883 (1919).
6. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Vol. 1, (1933 § 227, comment d.
7. Vert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 342 Mo. 629, 637, 117 S.W.

(2d) 252 (1938). "Clearly our decisions have made this right of control, or direction,
of the physical activities in performing a service, the essential test to determine
either who is the master of a particular servant as to any questioned act, or
whether the relationship is that of servant or independent contractor. Some courts
have also emphasized the test of whose business is being done," i.e. in whose
business was the servant engaged. 348 Mo. 341, 350, 153 S.W. (2d) 67, 71 (1941),
.supranote 3.
8. Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem (1940) 38
MIc H. LAw REv. 1222.
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he "sent it out," (i.e., the check-list) to show -the defendant that the work had.
been done according to its instructions.
Mr. Russell, plaintiff, testified that he did not employ Hoefer, nor Hoefer's
general employer, to do the wiring, that he did not discuss any transaction relating
to the range with anybody except defendant's representative who sold him the
range; that all payments were made by him to the defendant, Union Electric Company. It further appeared in evidence that defendant paid the County Electric and
Gas Appliance Company for the electric wiring installation done by Hoefer, that
the defendant had its inspector check over all the wiring; and that before the,
wiring was paid for the Fire Prevention Bureau inspected it and made its report
to the defendant.
The act causing the injury was solely one of alleged negligent installation oF
the electric wiring. Installation, as between plaintiff and defendant, was the task
of the defendant (an essential element in the contract it had entered into with the
plaintiff), and it was likewise work within the normal scope of defendant's business.
In relation to the defendant there were two ways in which the County Electricand Gas Appliance Co. might use their employee, Hoefer. They could contract to
do the work, and, the end being prescribed, i.e., the installation of the wiring, the
means of doing it may be left to the contractor; or they may contract in a different
manner, and, the County Electric and Gas Appliance Co. not doing the work
itself, may place its servant, Hoefer, under the control of another, i.e., may lend
such servant-and in that case not retain control over the work. "Control" would
not then be taken as the test; rather it would be-whether the servant or only the
use and benefit of his work was transferred.0 On the whole it does not seem the
parties contemplated their agreement should involve any transference of servants,
as contrasted with transference of service.
JOHN E. MILLS
REAL PROPERTY-CONTINGENT

REMAINDERS-ALIENABILITY

Grimes v.Ritsl
Conveyance was made to a tenant for life, "and then to the heirs of her body. '
Under our fee tail statute2 this created a life tenancy and contingent remainders
in the children. The life tenant conveyed her interest to the defendant, and her
children purported to convey their interests to the defendant by quitclaim deeds.
The life tenant's children survived her and sought to eject the defendant, contending that the quitclaim deeds were ineffective to convey their interests, and
therefore they owned the land in fee. Plaintiffs further asserted that quitclaim
deeds could not convey their after-acquired titles on the theory of estoppel by
deed and therefore the deeds were without any effect whatsoever. The Supreme
9. Century Insurance Co., Ltd., v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board.
House of Lords (1942) A.C. 509.
1. Mo. 197 S.W. (2d) 310 (Mo. 1946).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3498.
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Court, in an able opinion by Bohling, C., affirmed judgment for the defendant,
stating that under our basic conveyancing statute3 contingent remainders are freely
alienable, being interests in land; and contingent remaindermen take by purchase,
so that their title was not after-acquired.
At common law contingent remainders could not be transferred by grant. 4
The development of the Missouri law on this subject from 1865 to 1917 has been
traced by Professor Hudson.5 Prior to 1865 contingent remainders were probably
alienable in Missouri only as at common law, i.e., by release operating by way oF
extinguishment and by some method of conveyance which would create an estoppel;
but it seems that the supreme court was not called on to decide the question and
it is practically impossible that a case should now arise which would raise the issue.
Godman v. Simmons,6 the leading case on this problem, arose under the statute of
1865 and the court was undoubtedly applying the statute, although it professed to
be acting independently of it. Land had been conveyed to A for life, remainder to
her bodily heirs. A's children conveyed their interests, one deed purporting to pass
the fee simple, one purporting to pass all interests "whether prospective, vested or
contingent," and one deed being in the ordinary language of a quitclaim. The deeds
were held effective to transfer the interests of the children. No special attention
was given by the court to the question whether a contingent remainder could be
conveyed when the person to take is not certain, although it was raised by counsel..
Since the case was treated as one of an estate tail, this question may have been
deemed less significant by the court because the nature of a remainder under the
estate tail statute had not been determined.7 The dictum in Sikemeier v. Galvin'3
seems to approve the same result where no estate tail was involved. Brown v. Ful-kerson0 was a further extension; land was devised to C and the heirs of her body
with a gift over if she died without such heirs. Upon C's death without heirs of her
body, it was held that the deeds of C's nieces and nephews, executed before C's
death, had effectively conveyed their interests although the uncertainty as to the
persons to take was greater than in Godman v. Simmons. In Finley v. Babb

3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3401, from General Statutes of 1865, c. 109, § 1.
"Conveyances of lands, or of any estate or interest therein, may be made by
deed executed by any person having authority to convey the same, or by his.
agent or attorney, and acknowledged and recorded as herein directed, without
any other act or ceremony whatever."
4.

4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 341; 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS

(1939) § 708.

5. Hudson, Transfer and Partition of Remainders in Missouri (1917) 14
U. OF Mo. BULL., LAW SERIES 14. Because this article is now out of print, a portion

of the article is briefed in this note.
6. 113 Mo. 122, 20 S.W. 972 (1892).
7. Whatever doubt remained as to the nature of the statutory remainder
in an estate tail seems to have been resolved in the recent case of Mattingly v.
Washburn, 196 S.W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1946), another excellent opinion written by
Bohling, C., and it is now clear that a contingent remainder is created, rather than a
vested remainder subject to partial or complete divestment.
8. 124 Mo. 367, 27 S.W. 551 (1894).
9. 125 Mo. 400, 28 S.W. 632 (1894).
10. 173 Mo. 257, 73 S.W. 180 (1903).
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where the remainder was in the heirs of the life tenant, it was held that it was
conveyed by a deed executed by a son before the death of the life tenant. In Clark
a
v. Sires," Parrish v. Treadway" and Summet v. City Realty Co.," the remainder

was in the life tenant's heirs of the body, with the same result.
Professor Hudson points out that the courts have often made a distinction
between those contingencies which affect the person, and those which affect the
completeness of title which is conferred on an ascertained person. While the
Missouri courts had not expressly repudiated the distinction between contingent
remainders, his conclusion was that it would not be respected, stating:
"It is probably safe to say that any contingent remainder may be
aliened by deed under the statute, whether the object of the gift or limitation of the remainder be or not be ascertained."
The cases decided since the writing of that article (written in 1917) appear
to confirm that belief.
In ,Bopst v. Williams'4 land was devised to C for life, and at her death was
to go to her bodily heirs. C was appointed guardian of her only son, a minor, and
the court stated that a conveyance of the son's interest by C was valid, when the
sale was made under a statute authorizing sale of a non-resident minor's "real
estate." Again, no special attention was given to the fact that the contingency
was one affecting the person to take. Since the case was reversed because of fraud,
it can be regarded only as strong dictum as to the alienability of contingent remainders. Donaldson v. Donaldson 5 was another case wherein deeds executed by
contingent remaindermen prior to the death of the life tenant were held to have
effectually conveyed their interests. In Bock v. Whelan' a bankrupt had held
an interest which the court assumed was a contingent remainder, although the facts
-of his taking were not set out. The court there held that the contingent remainder
was within the meaning of the term "real estate" so as to pass his interest to the
trustee under the Bankruptcy Law, and the trustee's interest therefore must be
-determined and protected on partition of the land.
Since the persons who would take the land upon the death of the life tenant
inthe principal case were unascertained, the children held what Fearne called contingent remainders of the fourth class.1 7 The court called special attention to this
fact. It is submitted that by squarely holding that these interests are transferrable
by quitclaim as well as warranty deeds, the supreme court has repudiated any
distinction between contingent remainders with respect to their alienability, and
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

193 Mo. 502, 92 S.W. 224 (1905).
267 Mo. 91, 183 S.W. 580 (1915).
208 Mo. 501, 106 S.W. 614 (1907).
287 Mo. 317, 229 S.W. 796 (1921).
311 Mo. 208, 278 S.W. 686 (1925).
30 S.W. (2d) 607 (1930).

17. 1 FEARNE on CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (10th ed. by Butler, 1844) 5. The
other three classes as set out in this work involve situations in which the person
to take is ascertained. Contingent remainders of the fourth class then make up
one of the two types into which courts often divide these interests,
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they are freely alienable in Missouri whatever the contingency upon which they
are to vest.

The holding in the principal case is sound from a legal point of view. Section
3401 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) is sufficient authority for the decision, and the holding is the logical culmination of a long line of earlier Missouri
decisions. Further, the decision is desirable from the point of view of public policy,
in making interests in property more freely alienable. The court is to be commended
for declining to follow a technical common law rule which had served no functional
purpose for some five hundred years. It is hoped that if the question arises the
court will hold that Section 3401 permits the free alienability of possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry for condition broken.

J. KEITHREAL PROPERtY-RESTRAINTS

GIBSON

ON ALIENATION-RACIAL RESTRICTIONS

Swain v. Maxwell'
2

Kraemer v. Shelley

Two recent decisions by the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirm the validity in
this state of provisions in a deed or contract restricting property from transfer to
or occupancy by negroes. In Swain v. Maxwell owners of all but three of the parcels
of land in a Kansas City block mutually agreed in writing, for themselves and their
successors in title, that none of the land should be conveyed to or occupied by
negroes; that the agreement might be enforced by injunction or any other remedy;
and that the restrictions imposed should remain in force for a period of fifteen years
and be automatically renewed for a like term unless terminated by the parties. One
of the signers conveyed the premises in question to Maxwell, a white person, who
conveyed them to colored persons. Plaintiffs, parties to the agreement either originally or as successors in title, sued to cancel the deed to colored grantees; to enjoin
them from occupying the premises; and to enjoin Maxwell from conveying or renting to colored persons. The supreme court affirmed a decree granting the relief
sought.
The facts in Kraemer v. Shelley were substantially the same, except that occupancy alone was prohibited. In 1911 owners of forty-seven of fifty-seven parcels
of land in certain blocks in St. Louis executed and recorded an agreement providing
that none of the property should be occupied by non-Caucasians for a term of fifty
years. It was provided that the restriction, which was to "run with the title" in
favor of the original parties and their successors in ownership, should be enforceable
by suit to enjoin use and occupancy and to "forfeit the title." The parcel involved,
one of those covered by the agreement, was purchased ii the name of a straw
party and transferred to negro defendants who occupied the premises. Plaintiffs,
owners of another parcel covered by the agreement, sought an injunction against
1. 196 S.W. (2d) 780 (Mo. 1946).

2. 198 S.W. (2d) 679 (Mo. 1946).
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defendants' occupancy and asked that they be divested of title. On appeal the
supreme court held that plaintiffs were entitled to such relief.
The various jurisdictions are sharply divided as to the validity of restrictions
in a deed or property owners' agreement against transfer of land to persons of a
particular racial or social group.3 Many courts refuse to sustain them, usually on
the ground that they violate the rule against restraints on alienation.4 Missouri
decisions, however, following the rule laid down nearly thirty years ago in the
leading case of Koehler v. Rowland,5 have consistently upheld such restrictions."
This is true even where enforcement involves a forfeiture. 7 On the other hand,
probably all jurisdictions recognize the validity of provisions against itse or occupancy.8 Technically such restrictions are not restraints on alienation, though
practically restraints on use and restraints on alienation attain the same end, viz.,
non-occupancy by the excluded group.
Where private racial segregation has been sustained on principles of real pro3. The conflicting decisions are collected in Notes (1920) 9 A.L.R. 120,
(1925) 38 A.L.R. 1185, (1926) 42 A.L.R. 1273, (1930) 66 A.L.R. 531, (1936)
114 A.L.R. 1237, (1946) 162 A.L.R. 180, which deal with the various aspects
of the problem. See also 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 459; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1345; Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract
(1927) 21 ILL. L. REv. 704; Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes (1934)
32 MIcH. L. REv. 721; Notes (1933) 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 381, (1929) 3 CIN. L. REv.
323.
The language of the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (§ 406, comment 1) is interesting: "In states where the social conditions render desirable the exclusion of
the racial or social group . . . , the restraint is reasonable and hence valid if the
area involved is one reasonably appropriate for such exclusion and the enforcement
of the restraint will tend to bring about such exclusion . . . The avoidance of unpleasant racial and social relations and the stabilization of the value of the land
which results from the enforcement of the exclusion policy are regarded as outweighing the evils which normally result from a curtailment of the power of
alienation.
" ... the most important factor in solving this problem is the public opinion
of the state where the land is located."
Indicative of public policy are constitutional and statutory provisions relating
to race segregation. For example, Art. IX of the Missouri Constitution of 1945
provides for separate public schools for white and colored children.
4. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919);
Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White, 108 W. Va.
128, 150 S.E. 531 (1929).
5. 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918). This was the first case on the
question in a common-law jurisdiction.
6. Porter v. Pryor, 164 S.W. (2d) 353 (Mo. 1942); Porter v. Johnson, 232
Mo. App. 1150, 115 S.W. (2d) 529 (1938); GILL, MISSOURI TITLES (3d ed. 1931)
§ 186.
7. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918). The Rule
Against Perpetuities is generally held not applicable where title reverts to the
grantor upon entry for breach of a condition subsequent. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES (3d ed.'1915) §§ 299-311.
8. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919);
Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W. (2d) 175 (Mo. App. 1939); A.L.R. Notes cited
supra note 3; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 406, comment m; 2 SIMEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS (1936) § 460; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1345.
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perty law, questions of public policy and constitutionality have been raised. The
courts hold that such restrictions are not opposed to public policy, although there
is usually little consideration of the social factors involved. 9 And in general,
covenants or agreements restricting alienation to or use by persons of a particular
racial or social group have been held not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
and other constitutional provisions designed to prevent discrimination, which are
construed as applying only to state and not to individual action.' 0 However, as
an increasing number of cases come before the courts, against a background of
national concern over housing problems, these objections are receiving growing
support from writers." In this connection, it is significant that racial residential
segregation by legislative action has consistently been held unconstitutional.-2

Certain collateral matters are frequently made the basis of attack upon restrictions against transfer or occupancy.

Where conditions have changed so

radically as to defeat the purpose of the stipulation, it will not be enforced. 1
And if it appears, considering the language of the agreement and the surrounding
circumstances, that it was the intention of the parties that all the property owners
in the district should join in the agreement before it would become binding,

failure of some owners to sign will render the restrictions ineffective.'

But in the

absence of such intention, the practical result of the failure of some of the owners
in a district to join such an agreement does not ... affect the agreement's' validity
but affects its enforcement,"' 5 because the purpose of the plan may thus fall short

of achievement.
WILLIAM

A. Bm

9. Mays v. Burgess, 79 App. D.C. 343, 147 F. (2d) 869 (1945); Koehler v.

Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918); A.L.R. Notes cited supra note 3;
Martin, supra note 3, at p. 741.
10.

Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521 (1926); Queens-

borough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188
N.W. 330 (1922); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
Contra: Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892). See also Note
(1946) 162 A.L.R. 180; WILLIs, CONSTITUTioNAI LAW (1936) p. 581; Bruce,
supra note 3; Martin, supra note 3.
11. Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants (1945) 12 U. CHI.
L. REV. 198; McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 CALIF. L. REv. 5; Siegel, Real Property Law and Mass Housing
Needs (1947) 12 LAw & CoNTEMp. PRoB. 30; Note, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Against Negroes (1946) 40 ILL. L. REv. 432. And see Edgerton,
J., dissenting in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. (2d) 869, 873 (App. D.C. 1944).
12. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16 (1917); WILLIS, supra
note 10, at p. 582; Martin, supra note 3, at p. 726.
13. Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo, 166, 44 S.W. (2d) 857 (1931); Note (1946)
162 A.L.R. 180, 187; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 406, comment n; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY

(3d ed. 1939) § 1345.

14. Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W. (2d) 175 (Mo. App. 1939); Note (1946)
162 A.L.R. 180, 191.

15. Douglas, J., in Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W. (2d) 679, 682 (Mo. 1946).
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TAXATION-INcoME TAx-FAMLY PARTNERSHIPS

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mauldin'
Petitioner, owner and proprietor of the Rock Hill Coca-Cola Bottling Works,
executed a deed of gift transferring an undivided one-fourth interest in the property
and assets of the business to his wife. The assets consisted of bottling machinery,
other tangible property and the franchise which gave the company the exclusive
right to bottle and sell Coca-Cola in York County, South Carolina. The franchise
was personal to the petitioner. Shortly after the deed of gift was executed, petitioner,
his wife and son entered into a partnership agreement providing for a continuation
of the business as a partnership with profits and losses to be divided in accordance
with the capital contributed. Subsequent to the partnership agreement, the contract
right secured from the Coca-Cola Bottling Company was surrendered for the
purpose of making a new contract. The new contract was made and signed by
each member of the firm, as a partner. The wife, by the partnership agreement,
was expressly excused from exercising any duties or contributing any services in
connection with the management and operation of the business, but the right to
do so was not denied her. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that
the wife was not in fact a partner and the income reported by her was properly
taxable to the petitioner. This finding was upheld by the Tax Court,2 five judges
dissenting, and by the Circuit Court of Appeals,3 one judge dissenting.
The question arises as to what is necessary in order to constitute a partnership,
recognizable for federal income tax purposes, between husband and wife. Family
partnerships are recognized by the Tax Court, but they are given careful scrutiny.
However, the fact that the partnership was entered into for tax reduction purposes does not, for that reason alone, invalidate the partnership. The legal right
of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what would otherwise be his taxes is recognized. 4 But income is considered taxable, regardless of its legal owner or recipient, to the person who enjoys the income economically or who controls
the distribution of the income or the property producing it.i
Criteria commonly used to determine the validity or existence of partnerships
are given little consideration when federal income tax questions are involved.
The fact that the wife, under local property law, owns an interest in the business
is not a controlling factor, and state recognition of the partnership is of no importance under recent decisions. A partnership invalid under state law may be a
valid one for Federal Income Tax purposes. 6
Many tests have been used in the past in determining the validity of family
1. 155 F. (2d) 666 (C.C.A. 4th, 1946).

2.

5 T.C. 743 (1945).

3. 155 F. (2d) 666 (C.C.A. 4th, 1946).
4. Commr v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 164 A.L.R. 1135 (1946).
See notes and collection of cases (1946) 164 A.L.R. 1135.
5. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940). See note
(1946) 164 A.L.R. 1135 at 1145.
6. Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 Sup. Ct. 532, 164 A.L.R. 1135 (1946).
See note and collection of cases (1946) 164 A.L.R. 1135 at 1145.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1947], Art. 4

RECENT CASES

225

partnerships for tax purposes, but the test which now appears to be controlling was
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Tower.- The court in that case said that in order to create
a valid partnership, recognizable for tax purposes, the following conditions must
be met:
"If she (wife) either invests capital originating with her or substantially contributes to the control and management of the business, or otherwise performs vital
additional services, or does all of these things she may be a partner...."
In the instant case it is conceded by the petitioner that the wife contributed
nothing by way of services or control'to the management of the business although
she had the right to do so. The majority opinion found, at least by implication,
that nothing was contributed by way of capital originating with the wife. In a.
vigorous opinion, the dissenting judge pointed out that while it was true that alb
tangible assets, such as machinery, vehicles, etc., originated with the husband,
the exclusive right to bottle the product was obtained by a contract executed byall parties concerned with the Coco-Cola Bottling Company. This meant that
each partner, including the wife, assumed burdensome and onerous obligations
in order to secure the franchise. This franchise was found by the Tax Court to bethe chief asset of the firm. It was the opinion of the dissenting judge that this
franchise, being an exclusive right, amounted to a substantial contribution ofcapital in that the wife's responsibility on the contract originated with her and.
thus came within the rule of the Tower case.
A number of considerations should not be overlooked in determining the:
value of the wife's contribution by way of executing the "Bottler's Contract." In
the original deed of gift she was assigned a one-fourth interest'in the franchisesecured by the petitioner from the Coca-Cola Bottling Company. Since sheassumed no liability, she acquired, under the prevailing view of assignments of
contract, no additional burdens from the assignment itself.8 However, this fran-.
chise was surrendered and a new one substituted therefor. It is conceivable that theexclusive right to bottle the product would have been refused had not the wifebeen a party to the contract. She assumed an obligation, thus subjecting herself'
and her property to the possibility of liability for breach- of contract, and received7
in return therefor the enjoyment of a portion of the fruits of the business. It would
seem that when an individual assumes liabilities which result in the acquisition ofassets vital to the existence of the business itself, he has rendered valuable services, or has contributed capital originating with himself.9 Louis W. COWAN
7. Ibid.
8. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) § 418A. For contra view see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs (1932) § 164(2).
9. Many problems such as the one arising in the instant case could beavoided by the adoption of a plan under which the income of both husband
and wife would be taxed as a unit. A suggested solution is to require the husband'
and wife to file joint returns, but compute the tax as twice the tax on half thejoint income, with the resulting total tax allocated to each in accordance with
his contribution. See Altman, Community Property; Avoiding Avoidance byAdoption in the Revenue Act (1938) 16 TAx MAG. 138.
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TAXATION-INCOME TAX-LosSES-SALES AND PURCHASES BY HUSBAND AND WIFE
THROUGH STOCK EXCHANGE

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kohn'
Kohn and his wife had separate brokerage accounts with the same brokerage
firm and each held stock in various corporations. In several transactions Kohn,
for himself or as agent for his wife, had the broker sell through the New York
.Stock Exchange a specified number of shares of a particular stock. As to each
sale, the broker was instructed to buy a like number of shares of the same stock
for the non-selling spouse. Thus, as one sold stock the other purchased, both
operating on the open market. The purchase date usually followed the sale date
by one or two days; the purchase and sale prices varied slightly; neither Kohn
nor his wife knew to whom they sold or from whom they bought, and neither
buyer held the identical share certificates formerly held by the other. These transactions were for the sole purpose of establishing losses which could be used in computing net income for purposes of taxation under the Internal Revenue Code.
In reversing the Tax Court, the circuit court held that deductions for losses arising
from these sales of stock should be disallowed under Section 24(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 2 Such transactions were indirect sales or exchanges of property
between members of a family. The fact that the sales were made through the
stock exchange does not change the character of the transfers.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. McWilliams3 the facts were substantially the same as in the Kohn case. There were, however, three persons involved,
the husband, the wife, and the husband's mother; and each sale and purchase was
completed on the same day. Here too the court held that, even though the transactions were caried on through the stock exchange, they were sales "indirectly
between members of a family," and under the statute losses arising therefrom
-were not deductable in computing net income.
A contrary result had been reached in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Jckelheimer,4 where the facts were slightly different. There W, the taxpayer,
purchased bonds with a face value of $100,000 in 1935 and 1936. In 1937 H,
her husband, acting pursuant to a power of attorney, sold them on the open
-market for about $14,000 so that W might take the loss in computing her income
tax. The following day H, as one of three trustees of a trust set up by W's
father, purchased similar bonds on the open market for the trust at a cost slightly
higher than the sale price. The bonds were then placed in the safe custody
account of the trust. The court there held that the loss on the sale was an allowable
1. 158 F. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 4th, 1946).
2. Int. Rev. Code § 24(b) (1937) reads, "Losses disallowed-in computing
net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of losses from
sales or exchanges of property, directly or indirectly"(A)

Between members of a family . . ."

3. 158 F.(2d) 637 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946).
4. 132 F. (2d) 660 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
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deduction against the taxpayer's gross income for 1937. The sale on the open
market was regarded as a completed transaction, the court stating that the transaction was clearly not within the letter of the statute, and since the purpose of
the statute was only to disallow losses not "definitely at arms length" the loss
occasioned by the sale was deductable. There was a vigorous dissent by Justice
Learned Hand, however, in which he pointed out by way of analogy that the
loss on any sale of stock or securities is disallowed under Section 118(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code (the "wash sales" section), where the seller purchases
"substantially identical" stocks or securities within thirty days of such sale. He
then stated that read in the light of Congress's purpose, which was to ban deductions realized on losses sustained in any transaction between persons in certain
specified relations, Section 24(b) should apply to this situation. The courts in
both the Kohn and McWilliams cases approved the reasoning of this dissent.
The history of income taxation shows a determined probing on thfe part of
the taxpayer to find a means of lowering his taxes and the resulting efforts of
Congress to plug tax loop-holes. 5 One of the devices for tax avoidance most frequently used was the sale between members of the family. 6 The legislative history
of this statute, enacted in 1937, evidences a belief on the part of Congress that the
statute would effectually close this opportunity for tax avoidance3 But as has
been pointed out elsewhere,8 the construction given Section 24(b) by the court in
the Ichelheimer case stresses form rather than substance and makes the section
of little practical importance, since any persons within the specified relationships
could avoid its effect by making the sale and purchase through the stock exchange.
It is submitted that the approach taken by the principal case and the McWilliams case more closely conforms with the purpose of the statute than that used in
the majority opinion in the Ichelheimer case. Even though the purchaser does not
acquire the identical shares sold, he acquires an identical interest in the same business in the case of shares of stock, or an identical claim against the same business
in the case of bonds. Where buyer and seller are within one of the relationships
set out in the statute, a sale and purchase made under circumstances similar to
those in the principal case, although two transactions in form, are in fact one transaction. The unit (husband and wife, etc.) specified in the statute has not divested
itself of the investment. In view of the purpose of Section 24(b) the term
"indirectly" therein should be construed to cover this situation.

J.

KEITH GIBSON

5. Paul, Background of the Revenue Act (1937) 5 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 41;
Hearings,before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 12.
6. See Comment (1939) 49 YALE L.J. 75.
7. Preliminary Report of a Sub-committee on Ways and Means on Prevention of Tax Avoidance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 15; House Report No. 704,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 23.
8. (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 872.
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TAXATION-REAL ESTATE-TIME WHEN TAX LIEN ATTACuES

St. Louis Provident Association v. Gruner'
Plaintiff, a tax exempt association, sought a declaratory judgment to determine the extent of its exemption from taxes payable in 1944 upon a lot purchased by it from a non-exempt vendor on February 26 of that year. Plaintiff
contended, first, that it was not liable for any of the tax, arguing that the lien
of the tax did not attach until the annual levyA which was subsequent to the sale
of the land, and, secondly, that if this were not true, still the tax should be apportioned. The court held that the state's lien for the real estate tax attached
as of June 1, 1943, the initial date of the assessment, and that there could be no
apportionment, relying upon certain early Missouri decisions pertaining to liability
of a vendor on his covenant against incumbrances.
In Blossom v. Van Court2 the question in issue was whether the vendor was
liable upon his covenant against incumbrances for taxes, the initial date of the
assessment of which preceded the conveyance. The applicable statute3 provided
that the assessor should commence his assessment of property in the county on
February 1, of each year. The court in that case construed the statute to mean
that the tax was to be assessed against the person who was owner on February 1;
and that the property was charged with the tax as an incumbrance on that date,
although- the amount of the tax was not ascertained until subsequently.
This case was followed in McLaren v. Sheble,4 which was also an action upon
the covenant against incumbrances. In the latter case the pertinent statute' provided that the initial day of the assessment should be the first Monday in September. The court stated in its opinion that the lien of the tax took effect by
relation from that date.
Despite these early precedents, there has been some uncertainty as to the
date of attachment of a tax lien in Missouri as a result of other cases concerning
condemnation of real estate for public purposes. In United States.v. Certain Land
in the City of St. Louis, Missouri,6 the City of St. Louis filed a claim for distribution
to it as taxes of a portion of the fund paid into the court as compensation to owners
whose property had been condemned. The federal district court held that a real
estate tax in Missouri did not become a lien until the levy was made. Since the
conveyance preceded the date o'f the levy of the 1940 tax the city could recover
none of that tax. However, even though the conveyance was made after the levy
of the 1939 tax, the recovery of the city was limited to a proportionate amount
corresponding to that fraction of the year during which the property remained
in private ownership.' The applicable statutory provision7 was distinguished from

1. 199 S.W. (2d) 409 (Mo. 1947).
2. 34 Mo. 390 (1864).
3. R.C. 1855, Chap. 134, § 18.
4. 45 Mo. 130 (1869).
5. Mo. Gen. Stat. (1865) Chap. 12, § 12.
6. 29 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Mo. 1939).
7. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 9747.
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those statutes in effect at earlier times. It was pointed out that in Blossom v. Van
Court and McLaren v. Sheble the lien was imposed for all taxes "laid" upon the
land. 8 The preceding statute had imposed a lien for all taxes "assessed."
The
term "laid" had been construed to mean "assessed." Since the statute before the
court for interpretation included neither of these terms that court felt that these
two early cases were not in point.
Irj United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of St. Louis, -'Missouri0
the court disallowed that part of the claim for taxes asserted by the City of St.
Louis which related to the fraction of the year subsequent to condemnation by the
United States. This result was reached despite the fact that the date of the levy
preceded condemnation, so that there was no doubt as to the lien's having attached.
The constitutional provision "No tax shall be imposed on lands the property of
the United States, . . ." was considered as compelling this conclusion. This case
was reversed on appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 12 The court
stated in its opinion: "We think the court erred in holding that in the absence
of some state law to the contrary, the lien for taxes might be split or apportioned.
The rule is that absent some state law to the contrary, such lien must be paid in
its entirety....
"We are clear that under the statutes of Missouri, and the decisions of its
appellate courts, tax liens in Missouri, may not be prorated or apportioned even
though a tax-immune authority has acquired the property."
The following statement contained in the opinion evidently relates to the
date of attachment of the tax lien: "The tax is not depedent on continued ownerslfip but on ownership at the assessment date. As said by the Supreme Court of
Missouri in McLaren v. S1eble, 45 Mo. 130, 'The true and equitable rule is for
each party to pay the taxes assessed on account of the property owned by them
respectively on the initial day of the assessment, in the absence of any stipulation
to the contrary'." 13 Although the latter statement is unnecessary to the decision

8. Mo.

REV. STAT.

(1835) Art. V § 1.

9. Territorial Laws, 1804-1824, dhap. 299, § 17.
10. 51 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
11. Mo. CONST. (1875) Art. XIV, § 1.
In support of the theory that property acquired for a governmental purpose
becomes immune from taxes previously assessed and levied, the court cites Bannon
v. Burnes, 39 Fed. 892 (W.D. Mo. 1889) and State ex rel Baumann, 348 Mo. 164,
153 S.W. (2d) 31 (1941). However, in Bannon v. Burnes there was a specific
legislative enactment providing that the property should be exonerated from all
taxes and assessments; and in State ex rel City of St. Louis v. Baumann the matter before the court was construction of a provision of the Jones-Munger Act
making payment of outstanding taxes a condition precedent to the obtaining
of a deed by the vendee at a tax sale.
12. Collector of Revenue within and for the City of St. Louis, Mo. v.
Ford Motor Co., 158 F (2d) '354 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 10941 provides that real property shall be liable
for taxes on such property and establishes a lien against such property for the
taxes thereon. Section 10940 provides that every person owning property on
the first day of June shall be liable for taxes, thereon for the following year.
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of the case, it nevertheless indicates the attitude of the court toward this matter.
In United States v. Certain Lands in Jackson County, Missouri" title to condemned realty vested in the federal government on April 9. The date of assessment
was January 1. The ordinance levying the tax was enacted on April 15. The court
held that under the law of Missouri the lien attached as of the date of assessment,
and that there could be no apportionment. Hence Kansas City, Missouri, could
recover the total amount of the tax from the fund paid into the court by the
federal government as compensation for the condemned property.
The principal case does not discuss either the case of United States v. Certain
Land Situated in City of St. Louis, Missouri or that of United States v. Certain
Lands in Jackson County, Missouri. The court mentions that in United States v.
Certain Land in City of St. Louis, Missouri, the decision was 15ased mainly upon
the case of McAnally . Drainage District,'5 and it distinguishes the latter case
by stating that the issue was whether the lien for assessments of a drainage district
attached annually and not at what time during the year the lien attached. The
Missouri Supreme Court did not concern itself with the absence of statutory
provision that a lien should exist for taxes "laid" or "assessed." On the possibility
of apportionment the court simply said that there can be no apportionment of
a tax after attachment of the lien.
The principal case appears conclusively to have disposed of any doubt as to
the rule in Missouri as to the date of attachment of a lien for real estate taxes.
As pointed out by the court in United States v. Certain Lands in Jackson County,
Missouri, the federal courts are required under the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins'
to apply the law of Missouri as declared in decisions of its highest appellate
tribunal.
Subsequent to the conveyance in the principal case the Constitution of 1945
was adopted in Missouri. One oE its provisions is to the effect that a tax on
property shall be payable during the fiscal or calendar year in which the property
is assessed.17 This constitutional provision should not have any effect on the
attachment of the tax lien, however, except to shift the date from June 1 to
January 1, for in Blossov4 v. Van Court, as well as in United States v. Certain
Lands in Jackson County, Missouri, the tax was assessed and became payable within
the same year.
WILLIAM E. AULGUR

In State ex rel Hayes v. Snyder, 139 Mo. 549, 41 S.W. 216 (1897) it was held
that no personal judgment can be recovered against a land owner for taxes against
his land. Hence it would seem that Section 10940 must be construed as meaning
that the land owned by any person on June 1 becomes subject to the lien of the
real estate tax thereon, as of that date.
14. 69 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
15. 325 Mo. 348, 28 S.W. (2d) 650 (1930).
16. 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct 817 (1938).
17. Mo. CONST. (1945) § 3. It has been held that the fiscal year covers
the same period as the calendar year unless otherwise indicated in the pertinent
statute. Union Trust and Savings Bank v. City of Sedalia, 300 Mo. 399, 254
S.W. 28 (1923); Dennig v. Swift and Co., 339 Mo. 604, 98 S.W. (2d) 659 (1936).
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ToRTs-LiAILITY or HUSBAND FOR TORTS OF WIFE DURING COVERTURE-"HoME"

AS A JoINr ENTERPRISE.
State ex rel. McCrary v. Bland'

Upon the appeal of an action by the plaintiff for injuries sustained by her while
employed as a laundress in the home of the defendants, husband and wife, the
court of appeals affirmed the lower circuit court judgment for the plaintiff, and
based the defendant husband's liability upon its determination that the operation
of a home by a husband and wife was such a "joint undertaking" as rendered
the husband liable in damages for the wife's negligence in the operation thereof. 2
The negligence in this case constituted of allowing a mop handle to protrude across
a basement stairway in a position which caused the plaintiff to trip and fall down
those stairs, with consequent serious injuries. The case was transferred to the
Missouri Supreme Court upon certiorari, and that court, in the opinion which is
the subject of the present note, reversed the court of appeals upon this particular
determination, with the result that the husband was found not to be liable for
his wife's negligent act or omission.
The reasoning of the court is very succinctly stated by this paragraph of the
opinion: "Under the common law as well as under the statutes a husband is bound
to furnish reasonable support for his wife and minor children. So the maintaining
of a home by a husband and wife is not the result of an agreement or contract between them. It is the result of their marital status, a duty the husband owes to
his wife under the law. It therefore cannot be a joint adventure because a joint
3
adventure can arise only by contract or agreement between the parties."
The structure forming this forthright and effective disposition'of the question
rests upon two foundations: (1) the vexatious problem of joint adventure and
joint enterprise; (2) the nature of the marital relation, and the consequent
obligation upon the husband to maintain a home for his family. As-to the first,
the opinion regards the relationship of joint adventure as establishing the outer
limit of vicarious liability of the husband for his wife's negligence, and then defines
this relationship as one which can arise only by contract or agreement between
the parties. The second regards the maintenance of a home as a duty imposed
upon the husband not by contract or agreement of the parties, but by law. These

1. 197 S.W. (2d) 669 (Mo. 1946).
2. The court of appeals decision, reported in 192 S.W. (2d) 431 (Mo. 1946),
was the subject of a comment in (1946) 11 Mo. L. REv. 327. That comment dealt
more fully with the background involved in this case, i.e., the evolution of the
common law liability of a husband for his wife's torts into the statutory nonliability for such, except in those cases where he would have been held accountable
regardless of the marital relationship. The determination that the operation
and maintenance of a home was a "joint adventure," or "joint enterprise," placed
the instant case within this exception to the modem statutory rule. The opinion
in the supreme court deals only with such determination by the court of appeals.
3. 197 S.W. (2d) 669, 673 (Mo. 1946).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/4

26

et al.: Recent Cases

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

two propositions premise the conclusion of the case-the operation of a home is
not a joint adventure, and the husband is not liable for his wife's negligence therein.
The confusion of the terms "joint enterprise" and "joint adventure," and
their respective meanings, is well nigh hopeless. 4 The distinction which it would
seem that most of the decisions on the question fail to make, however, is between
a contract theory of liability, upon the one hand, and a tort theory of liability,
upon the other, the latter being based upon the idea of a vicarious responsibility,
where, "by reason of some special relationship between the parties, joint liability
is imposed as a matter of justice to insure compensation to the injured person."'
Certainly, a relationship which was so close as to have its origin in a contract or
agreement of the parties thereto would be more likely to have the requisite joint
control and common purpose to fall within the scope of this vicarious liability than
one not so definite in its existence. But does this category exhaust the possibilities,
and limit the extent of liability under the tort theory as well as the contract theory?
Do the two theories necessarily coincide in extent? The instant case so holds. And
there is some authority to this effect.6 The large majority of the cases cited in the
opinion for this proposition, however, appear to be actions dealing with the
contract, and not the tort theory.' On the other hand, there is considerable authority which recognizes the existence of relationships which impose vicarious liability
upon the parties, even though they are not encompassed by the term "joint adventure" when it is defined as necessarily arising from a contract or agreement.8
Most of this authority is found in the field of automobiles, where the negligence
of the driver is imputed to a fellow passenger.9 The bulk of these cases deals with
the imputation of contributory negligence, so as to deny recovery to such passenger,
rather than with imputing primary negligence, to render the passenger liable to
a third party who has been injured in the course of the prosecution of the joint
enterprise. 10 The theory also has been applied in other fields."' Quaere, then, as
to the cutting off of this string of vicarious liability according to the measurements
4. Id. at 672, the opinion characterizes this confusion in another of its concise statements: "Most of our decisions make no distinction between a joint
adventure and a joint enterprise."
5. HARPER, LAw OF ToRTs (1938) 676.
6. Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929), which held
that in the absence of a contract between the parties to an alleged joint adventure,
such a relation could not exist so as to impute the contributory negligence of one
to the other.
7. For instance, Tusant & Son'Co. v. Chas. Weitz Sons, 195 Iowa 1386,
191 N.W. 884 (1923), which was a suit by one party to an alleged joint adventure
against the other for an accounting of profits; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 206 Mich. 153,
172 N.W. 436 (1919), in which it was necessary to determine that a certain business relation was a co-partnership.so as to make proper distribution of the assets
upon the death of one of the parties thereto.
8. PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 42.
9. Lucey v. John Hope & Sons Engraving & Mfg. Co., 45 R.I. 103, 120
Atl. 62 (1923); Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co, 159 Iowa 52, 140 N.W.
225 (1913); Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521, 52 N.E. 1068 (1899).
10. See notes (1929) 62 A.L.R. 440, (1933) 85 A.L.R. 630.
11. Cullinan v. Tetrault, 123 Me. 302, 122 At. 770 (1923).
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-of a contracts ruler, "joint adventure" rather than at some point as indicated by
the appropriate torts scale.
Any doubt which may have arisen as to the disposition of the first propostiion
appears to be allayed, however, insofar as its effect upon the result of the instant
-case is concerned, by the treating of the second matter, dealing of the nature of
the marital relationship and its consequent duty upon the husband to provide
a home for his spouse. It is here that the supreme court takes a position directly
opposite to the decision of the court of appeals. The latter tribunal did not
regard the factual differences between the ordinary and usual "joint undertaking,"
.and the maintenance and operation of a home by a husband and wife, as sufficient
to remove the home from the domain of vicarious liability. The former court
feels that the contract of marriage, with its resulting social, moral, and legal
duties, among which is that of the husband to furnish reasonable support for his
-wife and minor children, is not the equivalent of the ordinary legal contract or
agreement, with its likewise attendant obligations.'1 The only apparent authority
in point upon this phase of the case is Mack v. Mackiewicze" cited in support of the
opinion. In view of this dearth of precedent, the supreme court seems to be well
justified in its result. This justifiability is certainly not mitigated by the fact
that the result leaves intact the protective pale around the family property held
as a tenancy by the entirety and lends no support to the "family automobile
-doctrine" to which Missouri has denied its sanction.14
JAMES E. CRAIG

12. Since this phase of the case was the primary subject of the comment
-discussing the court of appeals decision, cited supra note 2, it will not be examined
.fully here.
13. 9 N.J. Misc. 1219, 157 At. 117 (1931), where a husband was held
to lack the requisite control to make him a party to a joint enterprise with his
-vife in her negligent sweeping of the attic of their home.
14. Since this case was decided in the lower court solely upon the "joint
adventure" theory, and the appeal was upon this question only, no mention is
,made in the upper court's decision of possible alternative theories of recovery
against the husband. Two such possibilities which were suggested in the com-ment upon the court of appeals opinion in (1946) 11 Mo. L. REv. 327, are:
(1) regarding the wife as the agent of her husband in the performance of her
domestic duties, and (2) regarding the husband and wife as joint employers
of the servant and consequently as joint tort-feasors for the servants negligent
injury.
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